Introduction
Since the 1990s, the Chinese central government has intensively delegated public administrative functions to the local governments and urban neighborhood becomes a new arena of policy intervention. In the Chinese central governmentÕs 2006
Ôbuilding a harmonious societyÕ strategy and the Chinese Communist PartyÕs newest vision of Ôrenovating social management mechanismÕ on the Eighteenth National Congress (2012), the Chinese government repeatedly reinforced its determination to consolidate its institutional power at urban neirboughood level and the important role of neighborhood governance in public administration. In recent literature, urban neighborhood has been widely described as the most active interface of ChinaÕs statesociety interactions (Gui, 2007; Wang, 2009; Chen, 2010; Yue, 2010) . Different views have developed about the stateÕs power exercise at the neighborhood level. Some scholars believe that comparing to Maoist China, the current Chinese government is losing its ability of social mobilisation at the neighborhood level (Lin, 2003; Pan, 2006) , while others argue that the Chinese government is actually trying to penetrate its power into the grassroots society by strengthening its administrative control on urban neighborhood according to the institutional reforms (Xu, 2001; Li, 2002; . FoucaultÕs method of political genealogy, with its idiosyncratic and antiquarian interest in the emergence of political ethics and subjectivity (Szakolczai, 1993: 28) , provides a critical reflection on these questions. The influence of historical governing elements on the modern society has been widely discussed in FoucaultÕs work (Foucault, 1961 (Foucault, , 1980 (Foucault, , 1982 . ChinaÕs long history as a centralised political and cultural entity makes it a good candidate for a genealogical review on whether (and how) the historical governing rationalities and technologies play an implicit, but pervasive role in todayÕs governance. As Liu (2002) puts that, Ôit is the through the hierarchized and dispersed historical forces that organizational and institutional power gain their life in everyday life in contemporary China.Õ In recent years, the proliferating literature on ChinaÕs changing statehood contributes to an increasing number of studies on the governmentÕs changing governmentalities in the realms of education, environment protection, religious policies and sexual health (Jeffreys, 2009 ). However, ÔgovernmentalityÕ has not been systematically used as a conceptual tool in the realm of Chinese neighborhood governance.
This paper carries out a genealogical exploration on how urban neighborhoods have been used to exercise state power by the historical and current Chinese governments, and then further explores the correlation between the historical and current neighborhood governaning practices. The analysis framework is based on three main concepts of FoucaultÕs governmentaltity theory, including the rationality, government technologies and subjectivity. The term of governmentality, defined by
Foucault as the Ôrationalism of governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereigntyÕ (2004: 04) , has generated proliferating discussions on the ÔhowÕ of governing: how we govern, how we are governed and the relation between the government of the state, the government of others and the government of ourselves (Dean, 1999:2) . It provides a critical perspective to understand and evaluate the government practices in the modern society from the following dimensions:
¥ The Ôgovernmental rationalityÕ in the published strategies and objectives, especially in defining some problems and objectives and making them visible to public and obscuring other problems and making them invisible and Ônot importantÕ. This dimension looks at the way governments rationalize and legitimize their strategies and objectives with specific knowledge claim.
¥ The Ôgovernment technologiesÕ, or the Ôdistinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabularies and procedures for the production of truthÕ. It addresses the questions of Ôwhat methods does the government use to govern population and to accomplish its specific objectivesÕ.
¥ The governmentÕs characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents. This dimension concerns the forms of individuals and collective ÔsubjectivityÕ though which governing operates and which specific practices and programmes of government try to form (Dean, 1999) .
The remaining content consists of three parts. In the first part, the neighborhood designed with the feudal ÔZhou-liÕ planning values and the Feudal governing technologies will be reviewed. In the second part, the socialist rationalities and government technologies in the Maoist neighborhood of ÔDan-weiÕ will be explored and in the third part, the hybrid governmental rationalities and technologies in the postMaoist neighborhood of Ôshe-quÕ will be discussed. This paper will end with wider discussions on the impact of historical governing governmentalities on the current and future landscape of urban governance in China.
Neighborhood governance in Feudal China (221BC-1911AD)
In 221 BC, the first Feudal dynasty was established in China, which was known as Qin. During the following two thousand years, although this territory has seen the rising and falling of tens of Feudal dynasties, it has generally been regarded as a unified cultural entity with a centralized governing origin (Tanner, 2009 This famous paragraph is widely cited in books focusing on Chinese urban planning, as it not only contains detailed description of the ancient urban morphology, but also reflects the traditional ethics, ideals and the rulerÕs governing logics behind the spatial layout. The urban space is neatly segregated into pieces in order to emphasize hierarchy and facilitate the exercise of imperial power. All the elements in the spatial layout have a ritual meaning, including the direction, the width of roads the size of gates and so on. From these spatial elements, ancient Chinese cities developed into highly sophisticated, preconceived constructions, which served as a physical manifestation of cosmological beliefs, bureaucratic hierarchies, and the practicalities of daily life (Wu, 2013) .
Apart from spatial practices, social norm also played a pervasive role in rationalizing and strengthening state power in ancient China, with the form of a hierarchical Ôritual systemÕ. As discussed by Foucault and other governmentality researchers, governmentÕs practices and policies designed to engender peopleÕs internalized desire to adhere to social norm are deeply embedded in history (Ewald, 1990; Foucault, 1977; Miller and Rose, 2008; Nettleton elt, 2012 is necessary to change the current norm system to adapt to changes in the society (Yan, 2011) . Relating these rationalities to the ÔZhou-liÕ system, we can find very clear expression of social norm in the spatial planning: the important ÔspotsÕ of a city are especially mentioned in Kao-Gong-Ji, including the Ancestral Temple, the Altars of Soil and Grain, the Hall of Audience and the markets. These spots, which respectively represented the royal ancestry, god of land, politics and everyday life, were allocated in specific directions with respect to the hierarchical social norms. The emperorsÕ ancestors were in a higher rank than the god of land so their temple located on the east.
Similarly, the political hall of audience was regarded as more important than citizensÕ daily needs so it located on the south. Within the same logic, urban neighborhoods were planned and designed with abundant normative meanings. The following section will move on to explore how Feudal rulers implement their governing rationalities in the neighborhood design and administration. Qing Dynasty were all designed with a similar layout of the Ôideal cityÕ described in the Zhou-li. The wall of these cities kept rural residents out and gate guards strictly controlled the population mobility between rural and urban areas. Within these cities, the gridded road system further divided the city into enclosed blocks, which became the boundary of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were allocated around the city and took the form of walled and gated wards which, like the cities themselves, could be closed off at night (Wu, 2013: 62 Meanwhile, a strict curfew was declared to prevent residents moving outside their neighborhood in the evening. According to these regulations, urban neighborhood became integral to the everyday policing of social order within the city (Yang, 1993) .
Governmental technologies
Recently, the important role of wall, gate and curfew has been increasingly discussed in ChinaÕs urban study. It is strengthened by many researchers that the technologies of gate, wall and curfew played a pivotal role to facilitate rulers defining a neighborhood-based social space and controlling the mobility of residents (Barme and Minford, 1989; Jenner, 1992; Yang, 1994; Bray, 2005) . In fact, a broader review on the historical Chinese urban form shows that the logic of segregating urban space is reflected in various urban elements over time (table 2) . The open space, markets and distribution of functions activities are all designed in enclosed patterns with walls, gates and curfew control. These elements, together with neighborhoods, perfectly illustrate the Chinese Feudal rulersÕ practices of spatializing the authoritarian power: from the width of streets to the size of residences, from the curfewed neighborhoods to the regulated markets, the state exerts direct control on individuals by regulating their mobility and behaviours. 
Hu-kou
Apart from the spatial practices, since Han Dynasty, the feudal Chinese government used a Ôhousehold registrationÕ (Hu-kou) system to classify citizens into different social classes and govern them by restraining their spatial mobility (Chan, 2008) . The technology of Hu-kou was believed to derive from the population statistics system in the West Zhou Dynasty (1046BC-771BC), when the nation-wide population statistics were collected in both cities and rural areas to facilitate levy (Lu, 1999) . In Han Dynasty (25-220AD) the population statistic system was promoted nationwide and the term ÔHu-kouÕ was officially used as the basic unit of census and a means to implement population control. People from one family were registered as in one ÔhouseholdÕ (Hu). Once the citizens were registered into a certain household, their personal information was officially recorded and they were forced to live where they were registered. In most of the Chinese feudal dynasties, the household registration system has continually been used by the central government as a means of levy and conscription. The Tang Dynasty (618-907) government developed a sophisticated Hu-kou system, which classified citizens into nine classes (hu-fen-jiu) and levied them in different standards. The following dynasties of Song (960-1279), Yuan(1271 Yuan( -1368 , Ming(1368 Ming( -1644 and Qing(1644 Qing( -1911 all imitated the TangÕs Hu-kou system and classified citizens according to their land property, social status and career.
According to the household registration system, population mobility in feudal China had been kept at a very low level to facilitate sovereign control over different social classes.
Li: Feudal rituals
The strict and hierarchical neighbouthood administration system and social order described above was pervasively supported a hierarchical system of Li, or social rituals (Cook and Powell, 2000; Read, 2003; Gui, 2007) . The rituals in Feudal societies, from the statehood-level management to the everyday family life, were described in the Confucius Analects in many famous doctrines. The hierarchical ritual order in sequence was heaven, land, lord, family, teacher and self (Tian, Di, Jun, Qin,Shi). From emperor to ordinary citizens, everyone should respect this ritual order to keep the overall order of the country, as recorded in the Analects that: Ôif for a single day a man could return to the observation of the rites through overcoming himself, them the whole empire would consider benevolence to be hisÕ (XII.1).
At neighborhood level, the most influential rites were practiced according to clan rules. In ancient China, family played an important role in peopleÕs social life as most citizens lived in big families with strong sense of belonging to their clans (jia-zu) (Wright, 1962) . Within clans there was strict a hierarchy: the clan ancestors had the loftiest status, followed by the clan leaders, family leaders, parents and siblings. One must respect the ethical order meanwhile clearly understand his own status in the family to behave properly. Absolute obedience to parents was required, as recorded in the Analects that: ÔIf you see your advice being ignored by your parents, you should not become disobedient but should remain reverent. You should not complain even if you are distressedÕ (IV.18). The clan rules to a large extent specified the conduct of individual, family, clan and social life by emphasising the order of kinship and the relationship among members. As Wang Liu (1959) summarised that, the clan rules exercised social control upon the clanÕs individual members, and provided moral orientation to them with concrete specifications for proper conduct and desirable and undesirable behaviour.Õ In a broader sense, the clan rules regulated the order of families, which were the basic units of the Feudal society, and maintained the social order at grassroots level. Meanwhile, by strengthening the connections among family members, the clan rules to some extent kept citizens from social and political activities outside the clan, which was also believed to consolidate Feudal regimes.
Confucian Subjectivity
In Feudal China, the deeply-embedded hierarchy in social rites had a profound influence on how Chinese people identify themselves within the society and reflect themselves in everyday life. As Sigley (1996:468) put that: Ôto be Chinese meant to subscribe to a particular mode of living -to engage in certain ritual practices, ranging from the number of times one bathed per day to the position and rank one was accorded in a funeral procession.Õ Wright (1962) summarised some classical behaviour patterns of Chinese advocated by Confucianism as following:
(1) submissiveness to authorityÑparents, elders and superiors (2) submissiveness to the norms (3) reverence for the past and respect for history (4) love for traditional learning (5) esteem for the force of example (6) primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence (7) noncompetitiveness (8) self-respect in adversity (9) punctiliousness in treatment of others The first five personalities described above all required people to identify themselves first in a group, then within specific hierarchies. In their daily interpersonal contacts, people were reminded about the hierarchy in all sorts of relationship: the parent-children relationships, relationship between brothers, marriage relationships, clan relationship, friendship and so on. Similarly, peopleÕs respect for history, norms, tradition and examples all derived from their acknowledgement of hierarchy. The following four personalities on the other hand, reminded people to keep reflecting and cultivating themselves in their contact with others. In Confucianism, self is the always the center and souse of doing things and has the capacity of developing itself according to its interaction with the world (Cheng, 2004: 125) . This indicated that one should rely on himself to improve his personalities, knowledge and then become a better person.
Based on this doctrine, individuals became the microcosms of the society: by achieving a perfect moral harmony in person, political harmony can be achieved and by regulating themselves, individuals can contribute to an organized social order (Kupperman, 2004) .
The historical review above provided a governmentality-inspired perspective for many well-know governing approaches in ancient China. To summarize, according to explicitly reinforcing social hierarchy, both the widely applied ÔZhou-liÕ spatial planning system and the social norms were used by Feudal emperors to legitimize and consolidate their regimes. At neighborhood level, the Feudal rulers designed enclosed compound neighborhoods and used the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert regulation on citizensÕ mobility and behaviours. Meanwhile, the Feudal rituals, especially the Confucian doctrines and clan rules played a pivotal role in regulating the citizensÕ self-identification and behaviors in their relationship with their families and neighbours. This paper will now move to discuss the governemntalities of the Maoist regime between 1949 and 1977, which is widely recognized as an upheaval of the historical Chinese governing approaches meanwhile still have pervasive influences on nowadaysÕ neighborhood governance.
Maoist urban neighborhood governance (1949-1977)
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, the Chinese government adopted a rigid socialist system for the next three decades and launched massive political movements in attempt to build a completely new social structure. It looked that there was a huge revolution in the governmentÕs governing approach: the government firmed renounced Feudal rites in its discourses and launched all sorts of new spatial practices in urban construction to eliminate the Confucian and other Feudal ritesÕ influence. However, a deeper exploration showed that some Feudal governmental rationalities were implicitly inherited by the socialist government to legitimize its regime and facilitate exercising power at neighborhood level. Specifically, although the government adopted some new technologies to design and manage neighouhoods, these practices still aimed to shape collective-oriented subjectivity (Table 3) . 
Characteristics of citizenÕs subjectivity ¥ Collective-oriented ¥ Political active
Inherited governmental rationalities
After the foundation of P. R. China, the country was in an urgent need of postwar construction. To facilitate its administration, the Chinese government inherited the Feudal rulersÕ rationality to spatialize power in its practice of urban planningÑ firstly in the population mobility control between the rural and urban spaces, secondly in the spatial design. The Hu-kou Policy continued to be used to restrain the rural-ruabn population mobility. In January 1958, the first household management law ÐThe
People's Republic of China Household Registration OrdinanceÑwas promulgated to implement a city-rural dual management system (Cheng-xiang-er-yuan-guanli 1994:254) .
The walls demarcated the space of neighborhoods, as in the past they defined the realm of family (Bray, 2005) . In many ancient cities, neighourhoods were designed in very large size with comprehensive functions (Wan, 2013) . In socialist cities we found the same planning logic: the Dan-wei compounds were designed into enclosed spaces, which contained factories, commerce and comprehensive infrastructures. Most citizensÕ life radius was mainly within the Dan-wei compounds (Chai, 1996) . With these demarcated compounds, both the Feudal and Socialist government made to create a social space for citizens and manage them as a group.
Social norms continued to played an essential role in legitimizing hegemony.
Following the traditional governing strategy described in the Stratagems of the Warring State the Chinese government tried to build a new norm system to support its regime.
The hierarchy-focused Feudal norms were defined as backward and exploitive and were dismissed while Marxism and Leninsm were attributed as the core values to guide and regulate social behaviors. However, the contents of many advocated Socialist norms actually derived from ancient norms, especially Confucian norms. For example, on the Eighteenth CPC National Congress, the Socialist codes of conduct were defined as Ôpatriotism, delication to work, integrity and amity.Õ All these codes could be found in the Confucian Analects. As many researchers pointed out that, the specificity of Chinese socialism is that it is built upon a mature Confucian norm system. Therefore many proposed norms were more or less based on some Confucian doctrines meanwhile with Socialist theoretical support (Zhao, 2002) .
New Government technologies
The 20 th century saw a population proliferation and persistent urbanization process in China. The urban form became more diverse and irregular in patter. Many walled neighborhoods compounds were replaced by open and street-form neighborhoods. As the urban economy prospered and urban life became more diverse, the government gradually lost direct control over the neighborhood. After 1949, the government launched new many practices to strengthen the neighborhood-level administration. Spatially, the Dan-wei compounds were planned to replace the ancient gated neighborhoods and created new social spaces for citizens. Institutionally, the state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) and a two-tier administration system, namely Street
Office-ResidentsÕ Committee-together took on the role of public administration at neighborhood level.
Dan-wei compound
In Maoist era, the state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) took charge of providing accommodation and public services for their employees. To enhance productivity, they among the residents as they had highly similar social and life circle. For the citizens, the traditional family-based social lives were shattered and replaced by the intimacy with their colleagues, neighbours and leaderships. Therefore, many domestic researchers described the Dan-wei compounds as Ômini-societiesÕ as they were not only merely a spatial unit, but also contributed to the foundation of a collective culture and created a strong sense of belonging for citizens (Huang and Low, 2008) .
Street Office-ResidentsÕ Committee system (S-R system)
As the Dan-wei played the predominant role in delivering public goods and social welfare to citizens, most citizens had their housing, medical care and education services provided by their Dan-weis for free. There were only a small number of urban residents could not enjoy these welfares such as the disabled, unemployed and some socially disadvantaged groups. To administrate them, the government established a delegated organ, namely Street Office (jie-dao-ban-shi-chu), at the street level as a stopgap measure to organise urban residents who do not yet belong to any Dan-wei (Bray, 2006: 533) . [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] , the central government further strengthened the administrative power of Dan-wei and the S-R system was transferred into a pure political institution called the ÔRevolutionary CommitteeÕ (ge-ming-wei-yuan-hui). The Revolutionary Committees were nominally in charge of urban neighborhood affairs but actually handed most resources over to Dan-wei and the government power was almost vacant at the street level in cities (Murphey, 1980; zhu, 1999) 
Dan-wei subjectivity
Although the Maoist governmentÕs spatial practice of Dan-wei compound broke the traditional family-based social order and formulated a working class-based social order, these practices still concentrated on producing collective rather than individual modes of subjectivity. Like the Confucian clan rules which specified clear roles and statuses for different family members, the Socialist Danwei organize its members by allocating them specific work and roles. Civil affairs such as labour training, education, housing distribution and the management of personal information were all carried out in unity in specific time and space. The life circle and life style of citizens, from the costume to the everyday food, were all highly unified. The standardization of living and working spaces within Dan-wei reinforced the principles of egalitarianism and the residentsÕ common identity (Bray, 2005) . From this perspective, both the feudal clan and Socialsit Danwei worked towards producing a disciplined, collective and loyal urban population.
Political activeness was another product of the Socialist government practices.
Differing from the feudal governors who kept the citizens away from political issues, the Maoist government actively involve citizens in political lives to strengthen their political loyalty. Political activism was attributed a high-rank virtue of citizen in the government discourses (Solomon, 1969) . According to massive neighborhood-based 
Neighborhood governance in post-Maoist China (1978-Now)
Since 1978, the Chinese central government began to reform the economic structure and embraced a more liberal Ômarket economyÕ system due to serious financial deficit. To stimulate urban economy, the government loosened its Hu-kou policy control on population mobility and allowed rural residents to seek job in cities. The following three decades saw a massive urbanization process, in which the number, size and population of city proliferated around China. For the Chinese government, administering an opening society with a huge and increasingly fluid population is an unprecedented challenge. The diversifying social stratification, increasing population mobility and influx of rural-to-urban migrants has brought about huge pressure for urban governance. The socialist administration system which relied heavily on the Danwei turned out to be unsuited to the transitional urban society as many state-owned enterprises bankrupted with the shock of market economy.
In the 1990s, a series of reforms were adopted in the realm of urban neighborhood governance, from which we can see the governmentÕs transforming rationalities. Firstly, space played a much weaker role than before in regulating population mobility, as the governmentÕs urban spatial practices became marketoriented. Secondly, the government handed over the public services which used to be delivered by the Dan-weis to local governments, meanwhile devolving a part of this responsibility to private sectors, social sectors and individuals due to western influence.
Thirdly, the government brought back the traditional Chinese rituals to maintaining social cohesion meanwhile cautiously brought in western institutional experiences and discourses in the hope of steadily reform the neighborhood administration system from a rigid socialist to a more diverse and liberal system, without harming the Communist PartyÕs political stability. With the new technologies of ÔShe-quÕ and Ôwang-geÕ, the post-Maoist government worked towards implementing more soft control over citizensÕ thoughts and conduct and shaped more multifaceted subjectivities (Table 4) . 
Government technologies
¥ ÔShe-quÕ system ¥ ÔWang-geÕ
Characteristics of citizenÕs subjectivity
¥ diverse ¥ multifaceted ¥ ambiguous
Transforming rationalities
In the post-Maoist era, the Chinese governmentÕs spatial practices differed largely from the Socialist era. After bringing market economy system, the governmentÕs overall strategy of urban planning changed from evenly distributing industries and facilities in compounds to flexibly developing urban lands according to market forces.
To stimulate urban land economy, the government reformed the land ownership in the As the socialist Dan-wei quit the stage in national economy, the central government devolved increasing fiscal independence and administrative discretion to local governments to strengthen the local governmentÕs ability to govern and provide public services. The delegation of power was promoted between the municipal government and lower levels of public institutions in many big Chinese cities during the 1990s. At the neighborhood level, a new administration system Ðnamely She-qu Ð was promoted by local governments to replace the Dan-wei system and deliver public services. The Street Office-ResidentsÕ Committee system, which used to play a marginal role, was delegated to take charge of the She-qu system. Meanwhile, as the Chinese society became increasingly fragmented within the high-speed development,
the Socialist values and norms were strongly shocked by influences of international trends of thought. To maintain the social order in neighborhood, the government on the one hand brought back the Confucian norms which emphasized family-based ethical order and self-cultivation (Hoffman, 2010) , on the other hand began to bring in the western values of Ôpublic participationÕ in attempt to cultivate more responsible and self-governed residents (Hoffman, 2014) . The governmentÕs ÔShe-quÕ and recent ÔWang-geÕ practices demonstrated its changing rationalities.
Hybrid government technologies

She-qu:
The term ÔShe-quÕ refers to a both sociological concept and a geographical concept in Chinese: firstly, it is a demarcated spatial unit with clear geographical boundaries; more importantly, it refers to a street-level administration system (Bray, 2006) . In most cities, the two-tier S-R system plays the administrating body of She-qu. Heberrer, 2011:58) . According to its discourse of ÔharmonyÕ, the Chinese government brings back the Confucian norms of self-cultivation and ethical orders in order to encourage citizens to regulate themselves and behave properly in their family, neighourhoods and careers (Hoffman, 2014) .
At the neighborhood level, She-qu is targetted as a pivotal arena to Ôbuild a harmonious societyÕ and to cultivate responsible, moral and self-regulated citizens (Liu, 2005: 213-221) , as the former vice-chairman of P. R. China Zeng Qinghong (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (Read, 2003; Gui, 2007; Heberer, 2011) . 
ÕWang-geÕ
Since early 2000s, the western discourse of Ôpublic participationÕ were promoted in Chinese government documents with the rationality of handing over a part of public services to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. Following this new strategy, governments around China began to involve the private sectors and NGOs in the areas of property management, public health, rights protection, population management and so on. From 2006, the local governments across China began to adopt a ÔWang-geÕ (grid) approach to promote electronic technology for urban neighborhood management and further involve non-governmental actors in public service delivery (Xu, 2007) .
Visually, the Wang-ge looks like an exact regression to the Zhou-li city: a demarcated She-qu is segmented into 100*100 square meters grids and each grid is coded as a basic administrative unit (Jiang & Ren, 2007) . Meanwhile, as the Zhou-li city, each grid is assigned with a supervisor who takes charge of inspecting public assets and reporting problems to the government (Jiang, 2009) . The difference between Wang-ge and Zhouli city is that rather than creating enclosed residential compound and restraining mobility, the Wang-ge approach aims to facilitate information exchange and involve more social actors in public service delivery. In each She-qu the government establishes a community service centre. With the help of GIS devices, the Wang-ge supervisor can quickly register problems with each public asset on e-maps and report them to the community service centre (Yuan, 2007) . The staff members in service center will then forward these problems to the professional institutions for fix.
Recently, the wang-ge management was further used to facilitate residentsÕ daily needs and create jobs for local residents. In Beijing, the community service centers directly took phone calls from the residents and forward their needs such as takeaway order, healthy care and appliance repair to local enterprises and NGOs. In Ningbo, the ResidentsÕ Committees organised unemployed residents to provide property management to the other residents according to the Wange-ge management and created many community-based jobs. By the year of 2008, 52 Chinese cities had adopted Wangge management (Wang et al., 2007) .
Post-Maoist subjectivity
Living in the high-speed developing era, the post-Maoist Chinese citizensÕ lives are put on a fast track: the older generation experienced a radical urbanization process in the last thirty five years which took the U.S a hundred years to accomplish while the 
Conclusion
This paper explores the connection between the Feudal, Maoist and post-Maoist governmentalities in the realm of urban neighborhood governance. To summarise, spatial practice and social norm have always been regarded by Chinese governors as the main approaches to legitimize and consolidate their regimes at the neighborhood level.
In terms of spatial practices, the Feudal rulers design enclosed compound neighborhoods and use the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert direct regulation on citizensÕ mobility and behaviours. The rationality of segmenting urban space into administrative unit is inherited by the Maoist government to design enclosed Dan-wei compounds and used by the current government to demarcate the boundary of She-qu neighborhood as well as implement Wang-ge management. The difference however, is that the contemporary government no longer exert direct control over the neighborhoodsÕ spatial form and the residentsÕ mobility, but implements more pervasive surveillance over citizens according to modern technologies. Meanwhile, according to spatial demarcation, the governors not only specify a physical living space, but also create a social space for citizens and establish a neighborhood-based social order. In Feudal dynasties, this social order is supported by the hierarchical clan system. In Maoist era, this order is kept by the state-owned enterprises and in the post Maoist era, this order is supposed to be maintained by the neighborhood but is strongly shattered by the and Ôself-governanceÕ quickly take their rise in recent government discourses to devolve part of service functions to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. With these hybrid technologies, the government organises a mixture of hierarchical and regional neighborhood governing system. On the one hand, the community wardens are organised in a hierarchy to pass down the government orders and mobilise participation from local residents. These wardens use their private relations to transfer political assignments into personal requests to their neighbours, which to a large extent avoids conflicts (Sun &Guo, 2000; Zhang &Yang 2003; Gui, 2007 ) . On the other hand, in the new government technology of Wang-ge, increasing non-government institutions and individuals are invited by the government to deliver public services and they formulate a neighborhood-based regional governing network. The co-existence of the hierarchical system and the regional system is caused by the specific context of ChinaÕs social transition, but more importantly, it is maintained by the Chinese people living in it, whose subjectivities are shaped by Confucian, socialist, liberal and many other values.
This mixed characteristic of the current landscape of Chinese neighborhood governance clearly rectifies the previous literatures on neighborhood governance, which focused only on the Chinese stateÕs top-down administrative control over neighborhood or the emerging self-governing network at the bottom level.
The legacy of traditional and Maoist norms to a large extent regulate Chinese peopleÕs behaviours and facilitate the governmentÕs governance. Some values such as patriotism, collectivism, self-dedication and filial piety are still more or less embedded in citizensÕ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2010) . But in the fast-changing and globalizing society, Chinese people confront increasing cultural shock from all over the world and the traditional values are rapidly supplanted by modern thoughts. The Chinese government is inevitably loosing its control over the citizenÕ conducts. In contemporary neighborhoods, the neighborhood relationship is much more remote than in Dan-wei compounds. When the Maoist generation pass away in two or three decades, the government will find it more difficult to cultivate community wardens. On the other hand, the Dan-wei system is likely to totally retreat from ChinaÕs urban administration in the next few decades. By that time an important legacy of Dan-wei society Ð a welldevelopment social network in neighborhoods Ðwill totally to be supplanted by a heterogeneous neighborhood population and bring more challenges to neighborhood governance. As a matter of fact, more empirical research need to be carried out to explore the changing landscape of neighborhood governance, especially the increasingly active participation of non-governmental actors and the formation of citizensÕ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2014) .
